i
Our call to publish in our next issue is now open!
The Revista de Derecho Económico (Journal of Economic Law) invites the academic community, both national and international, to send their articles to our website, in the "Send article" section. The article must comply the rules indicated in the "Submissions" section.
The call is open untill October 15, 2023.
Final offer arbitration as a tool for regulation and for the protection of competition in Chile
Authors
-
Cristóbal Lema Abarca
Universidad de Santiago, Chile
https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9463-9598
Abstract
The final offer arbitration restricts the adjudicator’s options to one of the parties’ positions, thereby encouraging good faith negotiations, reasonable proposals and negotiated settlements. As detailed in this research, this variant of arbitration has been widely used for labor disputes in the United States, where it has also expanded into regulatory and antitrust arenas. The same has occurred in Canada, the European Union and Chile. Although the specific contexts differ, there is a common core element: bilateral negotiations with an imbalance in favor of one of the parties that can lead to abusive and/or disproportionate conditions. Final offer arbitration has the capacity to address this problem by distributing bargaining power between the parties and emulating the dynamics of a competitive market. Therefore, this paper argues that, properly used and designed, this type of arbitration is a relevant tool to be added —or used more frequently— as part of the arsenal of regulatory and competition authorities, and of individuals, in at least three situations: ex ante regulations that seek to replicate market
conditions; mitigations against transactions with horizontal, conglomerate and/or vertical risks; and measures imposed or concessions agreed in a judicial proceeding.
Keywords:
Competition Law, final offer arbitration, ex ante regulation, remediesReferences
* AAA, American Arbitration Association (2013). «Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses a Practical Guide». Disponible en https://bit.ly/3R2FuON.
* Abramson, Hal (2005). «Final Offer Arbitration». En John W. Cooley, Creative Problem Solver’s Handbook for Negotiators and Mediators: A Pracademic Approach (pp. 26-31). Washington: American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution.
* Adams, Charles (1987). «Final Offer Arbitration: Time for Serious Consideration by the Courts». Nebraska Law Review, 66: 213-248.
* Bustos, Javier y Fernando Fuentes (2014). «Eficiencia en mecanismos de arbitraje: El caso del Panel de Expertos del sector eléctrico en Chile». En Resolución de discrepancias en el sector eléctrico chileno (pp. 277-303). Santiago: Panel de Expertos, Ley General de Servicios Eléctricos. Disponible en https://panelexpertos.cl/biblioteca/.
* Carrasco, Nicolás (2018). «La regla de oferta final en el panel eléctrico chileno». Derecho PUCP, 81: 443-461. DOI: 10.18800/derechopucp.201802.014.
* Carrell, Micael, y Richard Bales (2013). «Considering Final Offer Arbitration to Resolve Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession Bargaining». The Ohio Journal on Dispute Resolution, 28 (1): 1-36.
* Çelen, Boğaçhan, y Onur Özgür (2018). «Final-Offer Arbitration with Uncertainty Averse Parties». Games and Economic Behavior, 109: 484-500. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.007.
* CRA, Charles River Associates (2020a). «Bilateral v Collective Bargaining and Arbitation Options, Response to the ACCC Concepts Paper on the Mandatory News Media Bargaining Code». Disponible en https://bit.ly/3sOFhH4.
- (2020b) «Suitability of FOA for the ACCC’s Mandatory Bargainng Code, Response to Commentary». Disponible en https://bit.ly/3t1bLOc.
* Chatterjee, Kalyan (1981). «Comparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information». IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 11 (2): 101-109.
* Chelius, James y James Dworkin (1980). «An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device». The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24 (2): 293-310.
* Chetwynd, Josh (2009). «Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes». Marquette Sports Law Review, 20 (1): 109-146.
* De Nisi, Angelo, y James Dworkin (1981). «Final-Offer Arbitration and the Naive Negotiator». Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 31 (1): 78-87.
* Donn, Clifford (1977). «Games Final-Offer Arbitrators Might Play». Industrial Relations, 16 (3): 306-314. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1977.tb00097.x.
* Farber, Henry (1980). «An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration». Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24 (4): 683-705. DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400407.
- (1981). «Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration». Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 35 (1): 70-77. DOI: 10.2307/2523142.
* Farber, Henry y Harry Katz (1979). «Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain». Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33 (1): 55-63.
* Feuille, Peter (1975). «Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect». Industrial Relations, 14 (3): 302-310. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00609.x.
* Gleason, Erin y Edna Sussman (2019a). «Final Offer/Baseball Arbitration: The History, the Practice, and Future Design». Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, 37 (1): 1-11. DOI: 10.1002/alt.21765.
- (2019b). «Putting Final Offer/Baseball Arbitration to Use». Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, 37 (2): 19-21. DOI: 10.1002/alt.21772.
* Gómez-Lobo, Andrés y Miguel Vargas (2002). «La regulación de las empresas sanitarias en Chile: Una revisión crítica». Perspectivas, 6 (1): 79-109.
* Grodin, Joseph (1972). «Either-or Arbitration for Public Employee Disputes». Industrial Relations, 11 (2): 260-266. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1972.tb00054.x.
* ICDR-AAA, International Centre for Dispute Resolution y American Arbitration Association (2015). «Final Offer Supplementary Arbitration Procedures». Disponible en https://bit.ly/3N1l8Ef.
* Lemley, Mark, y Carl Shapiro (2013). «A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents». Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 28 (2): 1135-1166. DOI: 10.15779/Z380127.
* Long, Gary y Peter Feuille (1974). «Final-Offer Arbitration: “Sudden Death” in Eugene». Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 27 (2): 186-203.
* Mcandrew, Ian (2003). «Final-Offer Arbitration: A New Zealand Variation». Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 42 (4): 736-744. DOI: 10.1111/1468-232X.00313.
* Metcalf, David y Simon Milner (1992). «Final Offer Arbitration in Great Britain: Style and Impact». National Institute Economic Review, 142 (1): 75-87.
* Meth, Elissa (1999). «Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and International Disputes». The American Review of International Arbitration, 10 (3): 383-454.
* Montero, Juan Pablo (2005). «A Model of Final Offer Arbitration in Regulation». Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28 (1): 23-46. DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-2354-y.
* Morris, Charles (1976). «The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System». Industrial Relations Law Journal, 1 (3): 427-531.
* Muñoz, Alexis (2021). «Arbitraje de oferta final: Una aproximación desde el derecho internacional privado». Tesis para optar al Grado de Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, Universidad de Chile. Disponible en https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/187808.
* Notz, William y Frederick Starke (1978). «Final-Offer Versus Conventional Arbitration as Means of Conflict Management». Administrative Science Quarterly, 23 (2):189-203. DOI: 10.2307/2392561.
* Pauwelyn, Joost (2018). «Baseball Arbitration to Resolve International Law Disputes: Hit or Miss?». Florida Tax Review, 22 (1): 40-76.
* Powers, Brian (2019). «An Analysis of Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration». International Journal of Game Theory, 48 (1): 81-108. DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0653-7.
* Reiner, Andreas (2012). «Final Offers and Sealed Offers as a Means of Reducing the Time and Cost of Arbitration». Zbornik PFZ, 62 (1-2): 437-456.
* Samuelson, William (1991). «Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information». Management Science, 37 (10): 1234-1247.
* Singh, Ramsumair (1986). «Final Offer Arbitration in Theory and Practice». Industrial Relations Journal, 17 (4): 329-338. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2338.1986.tb00548.x.
* Stevens, Carl (1966). «Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?». Industrial Relations, 5 (2): 38-52. DOI 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1966.tb00450.x.
* Tapia, Javier y José Luis Corvalán (2022). «En defensa de la arbitrabilidad de las cuestiones de libre competencia en el derecho chileno». Diálogos CeCo: 1-31. Disponible en https://bit.ly/3GjtyTN.
* Tijmes, Jaime (2015a). «Who Wants What? Final Offer Arbitration in the World Trade Organization». European Journal of International Law, 26 (3): 587-606. DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chv037.
- (2015b). «El arbitraje de oferta definitiva en la legislación eléctrica chilena». Jurídicas, 12 (2): 90-102. DOI: 10.17151/jurid.2015.12.2.7.
* Thompson, T. Scott (2019). «Final Offer Arbitration (FOA) as Merger Remedy, Perspectives of an Economist». Fordham Antitrust Conference. Disponible en https://bit.ly/3uHI5X1.
* Tulis, Benjamin (2010). «Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics and Applications». Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment, 20 (1): 85-130.
* Vergara, Alejandro (2012). «Balance, naturaleza y recurribilidad de las decisiones del Panel Expertos en materia eléctrica». En Actas de Derecho de Energía (ADEner) (pp. 385-400). Santiago: Legal Publishing.
* Weiss, Daniel (2015). «The Bomb Keeps the Lights on: The Use of Final-Offer Arbitration in Failed Retransmission Consent Negotiations». Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16: 685-711.
